Daily Papers

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing methods either fail to plan interactively or consider unimodal behaviors that could lead to catastrophic results. In this paper, we introduce an integrated decision-making and trajectory planning framework based on Bayesian game (i.e., game of incomplete information). Human decisions inherently exhibit discrete characteristics and therefore are modeled as types of players in the game. A general solver based on no-regret learning is introduced to obtain a corresponding Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, which captures the interaction between traffic agents in the multimodal context. With the attained equilibrium, decision-making and trajectory planning are performed simultaneously, and the resulting interactive strategy is shown to be optimal over the expectation of rivals' driving intentions. Closed-loop simulations on different traffic scenarios are performed to illustrate the generalizability and the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

We explore the non-equilibrium dynamics of a one-dimensional Fermi-Hubbard system as a sensitive testbed for the capabilities of the time-dependent two-particle reduced density matrix (TD2RDM) theory to accurately describe time-dependent correlated systems. We follow the time evolution of the out-of-equilibrium finite-size Fermi-Hubbard model initialized by a quench over extended periods of time. By comparison with exact calculations for small systems and with matrix product state (MPS) calculations for larger systems but limited to short times, we demonstrate that the TD2RDM theory can accurately account for the non-equilibrium dynamics in the regime from weak to moderately strong inter-particle correlations. We find that the quality of the approximate reconstruction of the three-particle cumulant (or correlation) required for the closure of the equations of motion for the reduced density matrix is key to the accuracy of the numerical TD2RDM results. We identify the size of the dynamically induced three-particle correlations and the amplitude of cross correlations between the two- and three-particle cumulants as critical parameters that control the accuracy of the TD2RDM theory when current state-of-the art reconstruction functionals are employed.

Disordered hyperuniform materials are very promising for applications but the successful route for synthesizing them requires to understand the interactions induced by the host media that can switch off this hidden order. With this aim we study the model system of vortices in the β-Bi_2Pd superconductor where correlated defects seem to play a determinant role for the nucleation of a gel vortex phase at low densities. We directly image vortices in extended fields-of-view and show that the disordered vortex structure in this material is anti-hyperuniform, contrasting with the case of vortex structures nucleated in samples with point-like disorder. Based on numerical simulations, we show that this anti-hyperuniform structure arises both, from the interaction of a diluted vortex structure with a fourfold-symmetric correlated disorder quite likely generated when cleaving the samples and from the out of equilibrium nature of the quenched configuration.

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We introduce a sequential testing framework that monitors whether observed play is consistent with a benchmark of strategic behavior, without assuming a fixed sample size. Our approach builds on the e-value framework for safe anytime-valid inference: by "betting" against the benchmark, we construct a test supermartingale that accumulates evidence whenever observed payoffs systematically violate the expected conditions. For repeated normal-form games, we take equilibrium as the benchmark, yielding a statistically sound, interpretable measure of departure from equilibrium that can be monitored online; our framework unifies the treatment of Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria, offering finite-time guarantees and a detailed analysis of detection times. We also leverage Benjamini-Hochberg-type procedures to increase detection power in large games while rigorously controlling the false discovery rate. Finally, we extend our method to stochastic games, verifying online whether observed trajectories adhere to a specified target policy, such as a computed equilibrium, broadening the framework's applicability to dynamic, state-dependent settings.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) often struggle with hallucinations, thus hindering their reliable practical applications. Existing attention-based mitigation methods mainly rely on indirect signals (e.g., attention weights) that fail to accurately reflect the actual information shift underlying hallucination generation. In this paper, we propose HEAL, Head-lEvel information disentAnglement and caLibration for identifying and mitigating hallucinations. HEAL first employs causal noise intervention on multi-head outputs to filter out causally redundant heads. Subsequently, it disentangles information distribution within the remaining heads via the counterfactual Difference-in-Differences, categorizing heads into four types. Through analysis, we observe: hallucinations happen when information distribution drifts away from a healthy equilibrium in synergy heads, not strongly correlated with the quantity or strength of modality-specific heads. Motivated by this insight, HEAL injects dynamic information calibration factors into the value vectors of synergy heads, and actively regulates visual-language dependencies, steering the output distribution towards factual evidence. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HEAL effectively reduces hallucinations across multiple MLLMs, offering a simple and interpretable pathway to enhance model trustworthiness.

This chapter provides a pedagogical introduction and overview of spatial and temporal correlation and fluctuation effects resulting from the fundamentally stochastic kinetics underlying chemical reactions and the dynamics of populations or epidemics. After reviewing the assumptions and mean-field type approximations involved in the construction of chemical rate equations for uniform reactant densities, we first discuss spatial clustering in birth-death systems, where non-linearities are introduced through either density-limiting pair reactions, or equivalently via local imposition of finite carrying capacities. The competition of offspring production, death, and non-linear inhibition induces a population extinction threshold, which represents a non-equilibrium phase transition that separates active from absorbing states. This continuous transition is characterized by the universal scaling exponents of critical directed percolation clusters. Next we focus on the emergence of depletion zones in single-species annihilation processes and spatial population segregation with the associated reaction fronts in two-species pair annihilation. These strong (anti-)correlation effects are dynamically generated by the underlying stochastic kinetics. Finally, we address noise-induced and fluctuation-stabilized spatio-temporal patterns in basic predator-prey systems, exemplified by spreading activity fronts in the two-species Lotka-Volterra model as well as spiral structures in the May-Leonard variant of cyclically competing three-species systems akin to rock-paper-scissors games.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

Limited attention forces organizations to decide not only how much to discuss, but also which issues merit discussion. We study strategic communication about a multidimensional decision when a receiver can respond only along a few endogenously chosen issues. Players agree on the ideal action but prioritize different errors. In equilibrium, communicated and omitted issues must be statistically unrelated and separable according to the sender's preferences. Thus, the sender's priorities determine the agenda; the receiver's do not. Synchronized priorities raise the receiver's best equilibrium payoff but lower his worst, so he may prefer a less synchronized sender.

Executing actions in a correlated manner is a common strategy for human coordination that often leads to better cooperation, which is also potentially beneficial for cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, the recent success of MARL relies heavily on the convenient paradigm of purely decentralized execution, where there is no action correlation among agents for scalability considerations. In this work, we introduce a Bayesian network to inaugurate correlations between agents' action selections in their joint policy. Theoretically, we establish a theoretical justification for why action dependencies are beneficial by deriving the multi-agent policy gradient formula under such a Bayesian network joint policy and proving its global convergence to Nash equilibria under tabular softmax policy parameterization in cooperative Markov games. Further, by equipping existing MARL algorithms with a recent method of differentiable directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), we develop practical algorithms to learn the context-aware Bayesian network policies in scenarios with partial observability and various difficulty. We also dynamically decrease the sparsity of the learned DAG throughout the training process, which leads to weakly or even purely independent policies for decentralized execution. Empirical results on a range of MARL benchmarks show the benefits of our approach.

Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the payment form is fixed, AMA's expressiveness is restricted, especially in distributions where bidders' valuations are correlated. In this paper, we propose Correlation-Aware AMA (CA-AMA), a novel framework that augments AMA with a new correlation-aware payment. We show that any CA-AMA preserves the DSIC property and formalize finding optimal CA-AMA as a constraint optimization problem subject to the IR constraint. Then, we theoretically characterize scenarios where classic AMAs can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to the optimal revenue, while the CA-AMA can reach the optimal revenue. For optimizing CA-AMA, we design a practical two-stage training algorithm. We derive that the target function's continuity and the generalization bound on the degree of deviation from strict IR. Finally, extensive experiments showcase that our algorithm can find an approximate optimal CA-AMA in various distributions with improved revenue and a low degree of violation of IR.

A quantum Cournot game of which classical form game has multiple Nash equilibria is examined. Although the classical equilibria fail to be Pareto optimal, the quantum equilibrium exhibits the following two properties, (i) if the measurement of entanglement between strategic variables chosen by the competing firms is sufficiently large, the multiplicity of equilibria vanishes, and, (ii) the more strongly the strategic variables are entangled, the more closely the unique equilibrium approaches to the optimal one.

This script offers an implementation-oriented introduction to deep learning methods for solving and estimating high-dimensional dynamic stochastic models in economics and finance. Its starting point is the curse of dimensionality: heterogeneous-agent economies, overlapping-generations models with aggregate risk, continuous-time models with occasionally binding constraints, climate-economy models, and macro-finance environments with many assets and frictions generate state and parameter spaces that strain classical tensor-product grid methods. The exposition is organized around four complementary methodologies. Deep Equilibrium Nets embed discrete-time equilibrium conditions into neural-network loss functions. Physics-Informed Neural Networks approximate continuous-time Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman, Kolmogorov forward, and related partial differential equations. Deep surrogate models provide fast, differentiable approximations to expensive structural models, while Gaussian processes add a probabilistic layer that quantifies approximation uncertainty; together they support estimation, sensitivity analysis, and constrained policy design. Gaussian-process-based dynamic programming, combined with active learning and dimension reduction, extends value-function iteration to very large continuous state spaces. Applications span representative-agent and international real business cycle models, overlapping-generations and heterogeneous-agent economies, continuous-time macro-finance, structural estimation by simulated method of moments, and climate economics under uncertainty. Companion notebooks in TensorFlow and PyTorch invite hands-on experimentation. These notes are a deliberately subjective and inevitably incomplete snapshot of a rapidly evolving field, aimed at equipping PhD students and researchers to engage with this frontier hands-on.

The statistical mechanics of Gibbs is a juxtaposition of subjective, probabilistic ideas on the one hand and objective, mechanical ideas on the other. In this paper, we follow the path set out by Jaynes, including elements added subsequently to that original work, to explore the consequences of the purely statistical point of view. We show how standard methods in the equilibrium theory could have been derived simply from a description of the available problem information. In addition, our presentation leads to novel insights into questions associated with symmetry and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics. Two surprising consequences to be explored in further work are that (in)distinguishability factors are automatically predicted from the problem formulation and that a quantity related to the thermodynamic entropy production is found by considering information loss in non-equilibrium processes. Using the problem of ion channel thermodynamics as an example, we illustrate the idea of building up complexity by successively adding information to create progressively more complex descriptions of a physical system. Our result is that such statistical mechanical descriptions can be used to create transparent, computable, experimentally-relevant models that may be informed by more detailed atomistic simulations. We also derive a theory for the kinetic behavior of this system, identifying the nonequilibrium `process' free energy functional. The Gibbs relation for this functional is a fluctuation-dissipation theorem applicable arbitrarily far from equilibrium, that captures the effect of non-local and time-dependent behavior from transient driving forces. Based on this work, it is clear that statistical mechanics is a general tool for constructing the relationships between constraints on system information.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

This article studies the change in the prediction accuracy of a response variable when the number of predictors increases, and all variables follow a multivariate normal distribution. Assuming that the correlations between variables are independently drawn, I show that adding variables leads to globally increasing returns to scale when the mean of the correlation distribution is zero. The speed of learning depends positively on the variance of the correlation distribution. I use simulations to study the more complex case of correlation distributions with a non-zero mean and find a pattern of decreasing returns followed by increasing returns to scale - as long as the variance of correlations is not degenerate, in which case globally decreasing returns emerge. I train a collaborative filtering algorithm using the MovieLens 1M dataset to analyze returns from adding variables in a more realistic setting and find globally increasing returns to scale across 2,000 variables. The results suggest significant scale advantages from additional variables in prediction tasks.

We introduce Equilibrium Matching (EqM), a generative modeling framework built from an equilibrium dynamics perspective. EqM discards the non-equilibrium, time-conditional dynamics in traditional diffusion and flow-based generative models and instead learns the equilibrium gradient of an implicit energy landscape. Through this approach, we can adopt an optimization-based sampling process at inference time, where samples are obtained by gradient descent on the learned landscape with adjustable step sizes, adaptive optimizers, and adaptive compute. EqM surpasses the generation performance of diffusion/flow models empirically, achieving an FID of 1.90 on ImageNet 256times256. EqM is also theoretically justified to learn and sample from the data manifold. Beyond generation, EqM is a flexible framework that naturally handles tasks including partially noised image denoising, OOD detection, and image composition. By replacing time-conditional velocities with a unified equilibrium landscape, EqM offers a tighter bridge between flow and energy-based models and a simple route to optimization-driven inference.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical framework that imports concepts from stochastic thermodynamics to model price impact and characterize the feasibility of round-trip arbitrage in financial markets. A trading cycle is treated as a non-equilibrium thermodynamic process, where price impact represents dissipative work and market noise plays the role of thermal fluctuations. The paper proves a Financial Second Law: under general convex impact functionals, any round-trip trading strategy yields non-positive expected profit. This structural constraint is complemented by a fluctuation theorem that bounds the probability of profitable cycles in terms of dissipated work and market volatility. The framework introduces a statistical ensemble of trading strategies governed by a Gibbs measure, leading to a free energy decomposition that connects expected cost, strategy entropy, and a market temperature parameter. The framework provides rigorous, testable inequalities linking microstructural impact to macroscopic no-arbitrage conditions, offering a novel physics-inspired perspective on market efficiency. The paper derives explicit analytical results for prototypical trading strategies and discusses empirical validation protocols.

Understanding and interpreting dynamics of functional materials in situ is a grand challenge in physics and materials science due to the difficulty of experimentally probing materials at varied length and time scales. X-ray photon correlation spectroscopy (XPCS) is uniquely well-suited for characterizing materials dynamics over wide-ranging time scales, however spatial and temporal heterogeneity in material behavior can make interpretation of experimental XPCS data difficult. In this work we have developed an unsupervised deep learning (DL) framework for automated classification and interpretation of relaxation dynamics from experimental data without requiring any prior physical knowledge of the system behavior. We demonstrate how this method can be used to rapidly explore large datasets to identify samples of interest, and we apply this approach to directly correlate bulk properties of a model system to microscopic dynamics. Importantly, this DL framework is material and process agnostic, marking a concrete step towards autonomous materials discovery.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

We used a dataset of daily Bloomberg Financial Market Summaries from 2010 to 2023, reposted on large financial media, to determine how global news headlines may affect stock market movements using ChatGPT and a two-stage prompt approach. We document a statistically significant positive correlation between the sentiment score and future equity market returns over short to medium term, which reverts to a negative correlation over longer horizons. Validation of this correlation pattern across multiple equity markets indicates its robustness across equity regions and resilience to non-linearity, evidenced by comparison of Pearson and Spearman correlations. Finally, we provide an estimate of the optimal horizon that strikes a balance between reactivity to new information and correlation.

We introduce Equilibrium Propagation, a learning framework for energy-based models. It involves only one kind of neural computation, performed in both the first phase (when the prediction is made) and the second phase of training (after the target or prediction error is revealed). Although this algorithm computes the gradient of an objective function just like Backpropagation, it does not need a special computation or circuit for the second phase, where errors are implicitly propagated. Equilibrium Propagation shares similarities with Contrastive Hebbian Learning and Contrastive Divergence while solving the theoretical issues of both algorithms: our algorithm computes the gradient of a well defined objective function. Because the objective function is defined in terms of local perturbations, the second phase of Equilibrium Propagation corresponds to only nudging the prediction (fixed point, or stationary distribution) towards a configuration that reduces prediction error. In the case of a recurrent multi-layer supervised network, the output units are slightly nudged towards their target in the second phase, and the perturbation introduced at the output layer propagates backward in the hidden layers. We show that the signal 'back-propagated' during this second phase corresponds to the propagation of error derivatives and encodes the gradient of the objective function, when the synaptic update corresponds to a standard form of spike-timing dependent plasticity. This work makes it more plausible that a mechanism similar to Backpropagation could be implemented by brains, since leaky integrator neural computation performs both inference and error back-propagation in our model. The only local difference between the two phases is whether synaptic changes are allowed or not.

We study the problem of detecting the correlation between two Gaussian databases XinR^{ntimes d} and Y^{ntimes d}, each composed of n users with d features. This problem is relevant in the analysis of social media, computational biology, etc. We formulate this as a hypothesis testing problem: under the null hypothesis, these two databases are statistically independent. Under the alternative, however, there exists an unknown permutation sigma over the set of n users (or, row permutation), such that X is rho-correlated with Y^sigma, a permuted version of Y. We determine sharp thresholds at which optimal testing exhibits a phase transition, depending on the asymptotic regime of n and d. Specifically, we prove that if rho^2dto0, as dtoinfty, then weak detection (performing slightly better than random guessing) is statistically impossible, irrespectively of the value of n. This compliments the performance of a simple test that thresholds the sum all entries of X^TY. Furthermore, when d is fixed, we prove that strong detection (vanishing error probability) is impossible for any rho<rho^star, where rho^star is an explicit function of d, while weak detection is again impossible as long as rho^2dto0. These results close significant gaps in current recent related studies.

Trader-facing dynamic fees are increasingly proposed for automated market makers (AMMs), but historical data do not identify how order flow would respond: trader-facing fees do not vary, trader types are latent, and a replayed tape is not a sequential decision environment. We therefore construct a minimal closed-loop simulator in which the missing signal exists by construction: two constant-product pools repriced by an equilibrium-inspired dynamic-fee rule, fee-sensitive noise flow, and closed-form CEX--AMM arbitrage. Equilibrium is used as a closure principle, not as an object the trader learns. Against a tuned benchmark ladder of schedule, planning, lookahead, and tabular policies, a small DQN is the only evaluated valid policy whose paired improvement over tuned one-step routing excludes zero. On a reserved final block of 1{,}000 seeds with completion forced to 1.0 for every policy, it reduces implementation shortfall under every tested intra-step ordering, by 13.3bps of order notional under the pre-specified agent-last ordering, and the edge is concentrated in, and learned from, dynamic-fee environments: under constant fees the paired difference is indistinguishable from zero. The result is model-conditioned counterfactual evidence about execution control in AMMs, not evidence about historical traders, equilibrium play, or deployable profit.

We develop a tractable identification approach for strategic network formation models with both strategic link interdependence and individual unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects). The key challenge is that endogenous network statistics (e.g. number of common friends) enter the link formation equation, while the mapping from model primitives to equilibrium network structure is generally intractable. Our approach sidesteps this difficulty using a ``bounding-by-c'' technique that treats endogenous covariates as random variables and exploits monotonicity restrictions to obtain identifying information. A central contribution is to develop a spectrum of fixed-effects handling strategies based on subnetwork configurations: tetrad-based restrictions that difference out all individual fixed effects, triad-based and weighted restrictions that combine ``difference-out'' and ``integrate-out'' steps by differencing out some fixed effects and profiling over the remainder conditional on observed characteristics, and general weighted cycle-based restrictions that unify these cases. We also provide point identification results. Preliminary simulations show that the approach can deliver informative bounds on the structural parameters.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

Ensemble Kalman Inversion (EKI) is a derivative-free, ensemble-based method for inverse and optimization problems. Its continuous-time formulation can be interpreted as an interacting particle system driven by a Kalman-type preconditioned descent direction. A well-known limitation of this dynamics is the possible premature collapse of the covariance of the ensemble, which makes the method sensitive to the initial ensemble. We introduce a second-order particle system in which the particles evolve according to an inertial dynamics. The model combines a Kalman-type relaxation force with damping, attraction towards the ensemble mean, and a short-range repulsive interaction designed to counteract ensemble collapse. The resulting dynamics can be interpreted as a heavy-ball reformulation of continuous-time EKI enriched by competing attractive and repulsive mechanisms. For linear inverse problems, we analyze the induced mean and fluctuation dynamics and identify a parameter regime in which fully collapsed configurations are linearly unstable. We further characterize asymptotic equilibria through a constrained optimality condition on the subspace retained by the limiting ensemble covariance and derive an exponential decay estimate. Numerical experiments illustrate the effect of inertia and repulsion on the ensemble dynamics and compare the proposed second-order method with first-order EKI-type

Stock price forecasting has remained an extremely challenging problem for many decades due to the high volatility of the stock market. Recent efforts have been devoted to modeling complex stock correlations toward joint stock price forecasting. Existing works share a common neural architecture that learns temporal patterns from individual stock series and then mixes up temporal representations to establish stock correlations. However, they only consider time-aligned stock correlations stemming from all the input stock features, which suffer from two limitations. First, stock correlations often occur momentarily and in a cross-time manner. Second, the feature effectiveness is dynamic with market variation, which affects both the stock sequential patterns and their correlations. To address the limitations, this paper introduces MASTER, a MArkert-Guided Stock TransformER, which models the momentary and cross-time stock correlation and leverages market information for automatic feature selection. MASTER elegantly tackles the complex stock correlation by alternatively engaging in intra-stock and inter-stock information aggregation. Experiments show the superiority of MASTER compared with previous works and visualize the captured realistic stock correlation to provide valuable insights.

Understanding equilibration and thermalization in isolated many-body quantum systems is a central challenge in quantum physics. The traditional approach focuses on the study of the full state of the quantum system which, at equilibrium, is best described by the Diagonal Ensemble. Here, we present Observable Statistical Mechanics, a novel paradigm that shifts attention from the full quantum state to the statistics of measurement outcomes. This approach is grounded in the Maximum Observable Entropy Principle, positing that equilibrium measurement statistics tend to maximize observable entropy under conserved average energy. By focusing on accessible measurements, the theory accurately predicts equilibrium probability distributions without needing detailed microscopic information like the energy eigenstates. Extensive numerical experiments on 7 spin-1/2 Hamiltonians demonstrate the broad applicability and robustness of this framework.

Partial correlations quantify linear association between two variables adjusting for the influence of the remaining variables. They form the backbone for graphical models and are readily obtained from the inverse of the covariance matrix. For compositional data, the covariance structure is specified from log ratios of variables, so unless we try to "open" the data via a normalization, this implies changes in the definition and interpretation of partial correlations. In the present work, we elucidate how results derived by Aitchison (1986) lead to a natural definition of partial correlation that has a number of advantages over current measures of association. For this, we show that the residuals of log-ratios between a variable with a reference, when adjusting for all remaining variables including the reference, are reference-independent. Since the reference itself can be controlled for, correlations between residuals are defined for the variables directly without the necessity to recur to ratios except when specifying which variables are partialled out. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, partial correlations do not have the problems commonly found with measures of pairwise association on compositional data. They are well-defined between two variables, are properly scaled, and allow for negative association. By design, they are subcompositionally incoherent, but they share this property with conventional partial correlations (where results change when adjusting for the influence of fewer variables). We discuss the equivalence with normalization-based approaches whenever the normalizing variables are controlled for. We also discuss the partial variances and correlations we obtain from a previously studied data set of Roman glass cups.

We provide a concise framework for generalized ensemble theory through a matrix-based approach. By introducing an observation matrix, any discrete probability distribution, including those for non-equilibrium steady states, can be expressed as a generalized Boltzmann distribution, with observables and conjugate variables as the basis and coordinates in a linear space. In this framework, we identify the minimal sufficient statistics required for inferring the Boltzmann distribution. Furthermore, we show that the Hadamard and Vandermonde matrices are suitable observation matrices for spin systems and random walks. In master equation systems, the probability flux observation matrix facilitates the identification of detailed balance violations. Our findings provide a new approach to developing generalized ensemble theory for non-equilibrium steady-state systems.

In the context of C^* dynamical systems, we consider a locally compact group G acting by ^*-automorphisms on a C^* algebra U of observables, and assume a state of U that satisfies the clustering property with respect to a net of group elements of G. That is, the two-point connected correlation function vanishes in the limit on the net, when one observable is translated under the group action. Then we show that all higher order connected correlation functions (Ursell functions, or classical cumulants) and all free correlation functions (free cumulants, from free probability) vanish at the same rate in that limit. Additionally, we show that mean clustering, also called ergodicity, extends to higher order correlations. We then apply those results to equilibrium states of quantum spin lattice models. Under certain assumptions on the range of the interaction, high temperature Gibbs states are known to be exponentially clustering w.r.t. space translations. Combined with the Lieb-Robinson bound, one obtains exponential clustering for space-time translations outside the Lieb-Robinson light-cone. Therefore, by our present results, all the higher order connected and free correlation functions will vanish exponentially under space-time translations outside the Lieb-Robinson light cone, in high temperature Gibbs states. Another consequence is that their long-time averaging over a space-time ray vanishes for almost every ray velocity.

We formulate nonequilibrium thermodynamics in which intensive variables acquire operational meaning through measurement protocols consistent with local reciprocity. Using physical equilibrium as a reference, conjugate observables are constructed by continuously adjusting devices along the local tangent space of the statistical manifold. In this relativity of observation, Onsager reciprocity holds locally, allowing inference-based Lagrange multipliers to be directly measured. This provides a systematic method to extend operational definitions of intensive variables to nonequilibrium states, highlighting their context-dependent nature and offering a concrete experimental strategy.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

In this work, we aim to reconcile several apparently contradictory observations in market microstructure: is the famous "square-root law" of metaorder impact, which decays with time, compatible with the random-walk nature of prices and the linear impact of order imbalances? Can one entirely explain the volatility of prices as resulting from the flow of uninformed metaorders that mechanically impact them? We introduce a new theoretical framework to describe metaorders with different signs, sizes and durations, which all impact prices as a square-root of volume but with a subsequent time decay. We show that, as in the original propagator model, price diffusion is ensured by the long memory of cross-correlations between metaorders. In order to account for the effect of strongly fluctuating volumes q of individual trades, we further introduce two q-dependent exponents, which allow us to describe how the moments of generalized volume imbalance and the correlation between price changes and generalized order flow imbalance scale with T. We predict in particular that the corresponding power-laws depend in a non-monotonic fashion on a parameter a, which allows one to put the same weight on all child orders or to overweight large ones, a behaviour that is clearly borne out by empirical data. We also predict that the correlation between price changes and volume imbalances should display a maximum as a function of a, which again matches observations. Such noteworthy agreement between theory and data suggests that our framework correctly captures the basic mechanism at the heart of price formation, namely the average impact of metaorders. We argue that our results support the "Order-Driven" theory of excess volatility, and are at odds with the idea that a "Fundamental" component accounts for a large share of the volatility of financial markets.

We study the optimal portfolio selection problem under relative performance criteria in the market model with random coefficients from the perspective of many players game theory. We consider five random coefficients which consist of three market parameters which are used in the risky asset price modeling and two preference parameters which are related to risk attitude and impact of relative performance. We focus on two cases; either all agents have Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) risk preferences or all agents have Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) risk preferences for their investment optimization problem. For each case, we show that the forward Nash equilibrium and the mean field equilibrium exist for the n-agent game and the corresponding mean field stochastic optimal control problem, respectively. To extend the n-agent game to the continuum of players game, we introduce a measure dependent forward relative performance process and apply an optimization over controlled dynamics of McKean-Vlasov type. We conclude that our optimal portfolio formulas extend the corresponding results of the market model with constant coefficients.

Correlated structures are intimately connected to intriguing phenomena exhibited by a variety of disordered systems such as soft colloidal gels, bio-polymer networks and colloidal suspensions near a shear jamming transition. The universal critical behavior of these systems near the onset of rigidity is often described by traditional approaches as the coherent potential approximation - a versatile version of effective-medium theory that nevertheless have hitherto lacked key ingredients to describe disorder spatial correlations. Here we propose a multi-purpose generalization of the coherent potential approximation to describe the mechanical behavior of elastic networks with spatially-correlated disorder. We apply our theory to a simple rigidity-percolation model for colloidal gels and study the effects of correlations in both the critical point and the overall scaling behavior. We find that although the presence of spatial correlations (mimicking attractive interactions of gels) shifts the critical packing fraction to lower values, suggesting sub-isostatic behavior, the critical coordination number of the associated network remains isostatic. More importantly, we discuss how our theory can be employed to describe a large variety of systems with spatially-correlated disorder.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

We present explicit formulas - that are also computer code - for 101 real-life quantitative trading alphas. Their average holding period approximately ranges 0.6-6.4 days. The average pair-wise correlation of these alphas is low, 15.9%. The returns are strongly correlated with volatility, but have no significant dependence on turnover, directly confirming an earlier result based on a more indirect empirical analysis. We further find empirically that turnover has poor explanatory power for alpha correlations.

As neural networks grow in scale, their training becomes both computationally demanding and rich in dynamics. Amidst the flourishing interest in these training dynamics, we present a novel observation: Parameters during training exhibit intrinsic correlations over time. Capitalizing on this, we introduce Correlation Mode Decomposition (CMD). This algorithm clusters the parameter space into groups, termed modes, that display synchronized behavior across epochs. This enables CMD to efficiently represent the training dynamics of complex networks, like ResNets and Transformers, using only a few modes. Moreover, test set generalization is enhanced. We introduce an efficient CMD variant, designed to run concurrently with training. Our experiments indicate that CMD surpasses the state-of-the-art method for compactly modeled dynamics on image classification. Our modeling can improve training efficiency and lower communication overhead, as shown by our preliminary experiments in the context of federated learning.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

The paper sets forth comprehensive basics of Discrete Thermodynamics of Chemical Equilibria (DTD), developed by the author during the last decade and spread over series of publications. Based on the linear equations of irreversible thermodynamics, De Donder's definition of the thermodynamic force, and the Le Chatelier principle, DTD brings forward a notion of chemical equilibrium as a balance of internal and external thermodynamic forces, acting against a chemical system. The basic expression of DTD is a logistic map that ties together energetic characteristics of the chemical transformation in the system, its deviation from true thermodynamic equilibrium, and the sum of thermodynamic forces, causing that deviation. System deviation from thermodynamic equilibrium is the major variable of the theory. Solutions to the basic map define the chemical system domain of states comprising bifurcation diagrams with four areas, from true thermodynamic equilibrium to chaos, having specific distinctive meaning for chemical systems. The theory is derived from the currently recognized ideas of chemical thermodynamics and binds classical and contemporary thermodynamics of chemical equilibria into a unique concept. DTD opens new opportunities in understanding and analysis of equilibria in chemical systems. Some new results, included in the paper, have never been published before.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Brain-like intelligent systems need brain-like learning methods. Equilibrium Propagation (EP) is a biologically plausible learning framework with strong potential for brain-inspired computing hardware. However, existing im-plementations of EP suffer from instability and prohibi-tively high computational costs. Inspired by the structure and dynamics of the brain, we propose a biologically plau-sible Feedback-regulated REsidual recurrent neural network (FRE-RNN) and study its learning performance in EP framework. Feedback regulation enables rapid convergence by reducing the spectral radius. The improvement in con-vergence property reduces the computational cost and train-ing time of EP by orders of magnitude, delivering perfor-mance on par with backpropagation (BP) in benchmark tasks. Meanwhile, residual connections with brain-inspired topologies help alleviate the vanishing gradient problem that arises when feedback pathways are weak in deep RNNs. Our approach substantially enhances the applicabil-ity and practicality of EP in large-scale networks that un-derpin artificial intelligence. The techniques developed here also offer guidance to implementing in-situ learning in physical neural networks.

We study a model of innovation with a large number of firms that create new technologies by combining several discrete ideas. These ideas are created via private investment and spread between firms. Firms face a choice between secrecy, which protects existing intellectual property, and openness, which facilitates learning from others. Their decisions determine interaction rates between firms, and these interaction rates enter our model as link probabilities in a learning network. Higher interaction rates impose both positive and negative externalities, as there is more learning but also more competition. We show that the equilibrium learning network is at a critical threshold between sparse and dense networks. At equilibrium, the positive externality from interaction dominates: the innovation rate and welfare would be dramatically higher if the network were denser. So there are large returns to increasing interaction rates above the critical threshold. Nevertheless, several natural types of interventions fail to move the equilibrium away from criticality. One effective policy solution is to introduce informational intermediaries, such as public innovators who do not have incentives to be secretive. These intermediaries can facilitate a high-innovation equilibrium by transmitting ideas from one private firm to another.

Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive -- collectively accounting for all possible outcomes -- and mutually exclusive -- only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices of all related outcomes should be \1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) 1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities. A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring O(2^{n+m}) comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets. We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

We present Coopetition-Gym v1, a benchmark platform for mixed-motive multi-agent reinforcement learning under strategic coopetition. The platform comprises twenty environments organized into four mechanism classes that correspond to four foundational technical reports: interdependence and complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802), trust and reputation dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909), collective action and loyalty (arXiv:2601.16237), and sequential interaction and reciprocity (arXiv:2604.01240). Each environment carries a closed-form payoff structure and a calibrated interdependence matrix derived from the corresponding report. Every environment exposes a parameterized reward layer configurable across three structurally distinct modes (private, integrated, cooperative). This separation of payoff from reward enables reward-type ablation, the platform's principal methodological apparatus. Four of the twenty environments are calibrated against historically documented coopetitive relationships and reproduce their outcomes at 98.3, 81.7, 86.7, and 87.3 percent on the validation rubric (Samsung-Sony LCD, Renault-Nissan Alliance, Apache HTTP Server, Apple iOS App Store). The platform exposes Gymnasium, PettingZoo Parallel, and PettingZoo AEC interfaces and ships 126 reference algorithms: 16 learning algorithms, 7 game-theoretic oracles, 2 heuristic baselines, and 101 constant-action policies. A reference experimental study trained the 16 learning algorithms on every environment under every reward configuration with seven random seeds, producing a 25,708-run training corpus and a 1,116-run behavioral audit corpus, both released under CC-BY-4.0 with Croissant 1.0 metadata. Coopetition-Gym v1 is the first platform to combine continuous-action mixed-motive environments, parameterized reward mutuality, calibrated interdependence coefficients, game-theoretic oracle baselines, and validated case studies.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

High-fidelity social simulation is pivotal for addressing complex Web societal challenges, yet it demands agents capable of authentically replicating the dynamic spectrum of human interaction. Current LLM-based multi-agent frameworks, however, predominantly adhere to static interaction topologies, failing to capture the fluid oscillation between cooperative knowledge synthesis and competitive critical reasoning seen in real-world scenarios. This rigidity often leads to unrealistic ``groupthink'' or unproductive deadlocks, undermining the credibility of simulations for decision support. To bridge this gap, we propose BEACOF, a belief-driven adaptive collaboration framework inspired by Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). By modeling social interaction as a dynamic game of incomplete information, BEACOF rigorously addresses the circular dependency between collaboration type selection and capability estimation. Agents iteratively refine probabilistic beliefs about peer capabilities and autonomously modulate their collaboration strategy, thereby ensuring sequentially rational decisions under uncertainty. Validated across adversarial (judicial), open-ended (social) and mixed (medical) scenarios, BEACOF prevents coordination failures and fosters robust convergence toward high-quality solutions, demonstrating superior potential for reliable social simulation. Source codes and datasets are publicly released at: https://github.com/WUT-IDEA/BEACOF.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

Differentially private learning algorithms inject noise into the learning process. While the most common private learning algorithm, DP-SGD, adds independent Gaussian noise in each iteration, recent work on matrix factorization mechanisms has shown empirically that introducing correlations in the noise can greatly improve their utility. We characterize the asymptotic learning utility for any choice of the correlation function, giving precise analytical bounds for linear regression and as the solution to a convex program for general convex functions. We show, using these bounds, how correlated noise provably improves upon vanilla DP-SGD as a function of problem parameters such as the effective dimension and condition number. Moreover, our analytical expression for the near-optimal correlation function circumvents the cubic complexity of the semi-definite program used to optimize the noise correlation matrix in previous work. We validate our theory with experiments on private deep learning. Our work matches or outperforms prior work while being efficient both in terms of compute and memory.

Understanding the performance of machine learning (ML) models across diverse data distributions is critically important for reliable applications. Despite recent empirical studies positing a near-perfect linear correlation between in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) accuracies, we empirically demonstrate that this correlation is more nuanced under subpopulation shifts. Through rigorous experimentation and analysis across a variety of datasets, models, and training epochs, we demonstrate that OOD performance often has a nonlinear correlation with ID performance in subpopulation shifts. Our findings, which contrast previous studies that have posited a linear correlation in model performance during distribution shifts, reveal a "moon shape" correlation (parabolic uptrend curve) between the test performance on the majority subpopulation and the minority subpopulation. This non-trivial nonlinear correlation holds across model architectures, hyperparameters, training durations, and the imbalance between subpopulations. Furthermore, we found that the nonlinearity of this "moon shape" is causally influenced by the degree of spurious correlations in the training data. Our controlled experiments show that stronger spurious correlation in the training data creates more nonlinear performance correlation. We provide complementary experimental and theoretical analyses for this phenomenon, and discuss its implications for ML reliability and fairness. Our work highlights the importance of understanding the nonlinear effects of model improvement on performance in different subpopulations, and has the potential to inform the development of more equitable and responsible machine learning models.

The growth rate of Av(1324) is the last unknown Stanley-Wilf limit of a length-four pattern. Since 2020 the best rigorous lower bound has been the 10.271012 of Bevan, Brignall, Elvey Price and Pantone; we raise it to 10.412263. Their construction lays 1324-avoiders along an infinite staircase of two-cell blocks alternating with single connecting cells, and forbids a 1324 by a local condition on how the points of a block interleave with the components of the cell beside it. Certain points of a block, its leaves, may be exempted from that condition. They exempt them on one axis only, and report that they could not count the possibilities when both are exempted. This paper exempts them on both axes and counts the result. The second relaxation is their own argument read in the other axis, and the Harris correlation inequality bounds the joint count below by the product of the two counts taken separately, at the cost of one factor of the component generating function.

Classical supply chain risk models treat node failures as statistically independent events, systematically underestimating cascade probabilities when supplier dependencies are strongly correlated. At n=40 nodes, the full correlated failure distribution requires O(2^n) classical samples, a regime where exact simulation demands 17.6 TB of memory and over 369,000 hours of computation on a standard workstation. We present QR-SPPS (Quantum-Native Retail Shock Propagation and Policy Stress Simulator), a three-algorithm quantum pipeline implemented using the Qiskit framework with the Aer statevector_simulator backend. First, a 40-node, 4-tier retail supply network is encoded as a 40-qubit Ising Hamiltonian using OpenFermion QubitOperator, where ZZ coupling terms encode correlated cascade probabilities structurally absent from classical Monte Carlo. Second, a hardware-efficient VQE circuit finds the ground-state stress distribution with zero error, detecting entangled cascade failures in 14/40 nodes with max|ΔP|=0.637 versus classical Monte Carlo. Third, we introduce the first application of ADAPT-VQE gradient screening to counterfactual macroeconomic policy evaluation: six crisis interventions are ranked in O(1) Qiskit operator evaluations per policy, a 287x speedup over sequential VQE re-optimisation. Fourth, Density-of-States QPE (DOS-QPE) reconstructs the full eigenspectrum via 32-step Trotter evolution and introduces a novel mapping of the Boltzmann catastrophe probability P_cat(T) to VIX-equivalent market volatility temperature, enabling direct integration into regulatory Value-at-Risk frameworks. Qiskit Aer scaling benchmarks confirm exponential classical intractability at 40 qubits.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

Redundancies and correlations in the responses of sensory neurons seem to waste neural resources but can carry cues about structured stimuli and may help the brain to correct for response errors. To assess how the retina negotiates this tradeoff, we measured simultaneous responses from populations of ganglion cells presented with natural and artificial stimuli that varied greatly in correlation structure. We found that pairwise correlations in the retinal output remained similar across stimuli with widely different spatio-temporal correlations including white noise and natural movies. Meanwhile, purely spatial correlations tended to increase correlations in the retinal response. Responding to more correlated stimuli, ganglion cells had faster temporal kernels and tended to have stronger surrounds. These properties of individual cells, along with gain changes that opposed changes in effective contrast at the ganglion cell input, largely explained the similarity of pairwise correlations across stimuli where receptive field measurements were possible.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

It is well-known that, in the Bachelier model, when asset prices and volatilities are uncorrelated, the implied volatility coincides with the fair value of the volatility swap. In this paper, via classical Itô calculus and Taylor expansions, we write the price for out-of-the-money (OTM) and in-the-money (ITM) options as an expansion with respect to the moneyness, where the coefficients are related to the negative (non-integer) powers of the future mean volatility. As an a application, we use it as a control variate to reduce the variance of Monte Carlo option prices in the correlated case.

Prediction markets allow users to trade on outcomes of real-world events, but are prone to fragmentation through overlapping questions, implicit equivalences, and hidden contradictions across markets. We present an agentic AI pipeline that autonomously (i) clusters markets into coherent topical groups using natural-language understanding over contract text and metadata, and (ii) identifies within-cluster market pairs whose resolved outcomes exhibit strong dependence, including same-outcome (correlated) and different-outcome (anti-correlated) relationships. Using a historical dataset of resolved markets on Polymarket, we evaluate the accuracy of the agent's relational predictions. We then translate discovered relationships into a simple trading strategy to quantify how these relationships map to actionable signals. Results show that agent-identified relationships achieve roughly 60-70% accuracy, and their induced trading strategies earn about 20% average returns over week-long horizons, highlighting the ability of agentic AI and large language models to uncover latent semantic structure in prediction markets.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

This study examines the performance of finite spin quantum batteries (QBs) using Heisenberg spin models with Dzyaloshinsky-Moriya (DM) and Kaplan--Shekhtman--Entin-Wohlman--Aharony (KSEA) interactions. The QBs are modeled as interacting quantum spins in local inhomogeneous magnetic fields, inducing variable Zeeman splitting. We derive analytical expressions for the maximal extractable work, ergotropy and the capacity of QBs, as recently examined by Yang et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 131, 030402 (2023)]. These quantities are analytically linked through certain quantum correlations, as posited in the aforementioned study. Different Heisenberg spin chain models exhibit distinct behaviors under varying conditions, emphasizing the importance of model selection for optimizing QB performance. In antiferromagnetic (AFM) systems, maximum ergotropy occurs with a Zeeman splitting field applied to either spin, while ferromagnetic (FM) systems benefit from a uniform Zeeman field. Temperature significantly impacts QB performance, with ergotropy in the AFM case being generally more robust against temperature increases compared to the FM case. Incorporating DM and KSEA couplings can significantly enhance the capacity and ergotropy extraction of QBs. However, there exists a threshold beyond which additional increases in these interactions cause a sharp decline in capacity and ergotropy. This behavior is influenced by temperature and quantum coherence, which signal the occurrence of a sudden phase transition. The resource theory of quantum coherence proposed by Baumgratz et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 113, 140401 (2014)] plays a crucial role in enhancing ergotropy and capacity. However, ergotropy is limited by both the system's capacity and the amount of coherence. These findings support the theoretical framework of spin-based QBs and may benefit future research on quantum energy storage devices.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is widely used to train reasoning language models, where it computes advantages by centering and normalizing rewards across rollouts of the same prompt. For multiple rewards, GRPO sums the reward components and normalizes the total reward by its within-group standard deviation. The corresponding variance equals the sum of all pairwise reward covariances. For a fixed centered reward, larger aggregate covariance produces smaller advantages, and vice versa, allowing update magnitudes to adapt to reward dependence. However, correlated rewards with large scales can dominate this normalization and suppress signals from smaller-scale rewards. We propose Correlation-Normalized GRPO (CorrGRPO), which normalizes pairwise covariances into Pearson correlation coefficients. CorrGRPO keeps the centered total reward unchanged while balancing the influence of differently scaled rewards on the correlation-based normalization. This allows advantage magnitudes to adapt to reward correlations without the normalization being dominated by large-scale reward components. We compare CorrGRPO with GRPO and other variants on code generation, tool calling, and agent security, using models ranging from 0.5B to 8B parameters. These tasks all involve multiple rewards that can improve together or present tradeoffs. Results show improvements across three domains, including code generation, tool calling, and agent security. Our code is available at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/CorrGRPO.

How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.

As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of `decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning consistently converge to stable cooperation, directly contradicting classical game-theoretic predictions of mutual defection. To understand this phenomenon, we introduce the `embedded Bayesian agent,' a theoretical model for foundation model agents. By shifting from decoupled to embedded agency, these agents model themselves as part of the universe they inhabit, maintaining epistemic uncertainty about their own decision-making algorithms. We show that by inferring whether others are behaviorally similar, an embedded agent treats its own deliberation during planning as evidence: a decision to cooperate predicts a similar decision by a similar partner. We formalize this mechanism of similarity inference through the `embedded equilibrium,' a novel solution concept replacing the Nash equilibrium to provide a foundational game theory for the social behavior of modern AI agents.

Distance correlation is a novel class of multivariate dependence measure, taking positive values between 0 and 1, and applicable to random vectors of arbitrary dimensions, not necessarily equal. It offers several advantages over the well-known Pearson correlation coefficient, the most important is that distance correlation equals zero if and only if the random vectors are independent. There are two different estimators of the distance correlation available in the literature. The first one, proposed by Székely et al. (2007), is based on an asymptotically unbiased estimator of the distance covariance which turns out to be a V-statistic. The second one builds on an unbiased estimator of the distance covariance proposed in Székely et al. (2014), proved to be an U-statistic by Székely and Huo (2016). This study evaluates their efficiency (mean squared error) and compares computational times for both methods under different dependence structures. Under conditions of independence or near-independence, the V-estimates are biased, while the U-estimator frequently cannot be computed due to negative values. To address this challenge, a convex linear combination of the former estimators is proposed and studied, yielding good results regardless of the level of dependence.

This research employs quantitative techniques interpreted through relevant economic theories to analyze a proposed U.S. "Discounted Reciprocal Tariff" structure. Statistical modeling (linear regression) quantifies the policy's consistent 'discounted reciprocity' pattern, which is interpreted using a Game Theory perspective on strategic interaction. Machine learning (K-Means clustering) identifies distinct country typologies based on tariff exposure and Economic Complexity Index (ECI), linking the policy to Economic Complexity theory. The study's primary application focuses on the major coffee exporting sector, utilizing simulation modeling grounded in principles of demand elasticity and substitution to project potential trade flow impacts. Specifically, for coffee, this simulation demonstrates how the proposed tariff differentials can induce significant substitution effects, projecting a potential shift in U.S. import demand away from high-tariff origins toward lower-tariff competitors. This disruption, stemming from the tariffs impacting exporting countries, is projected to ultimately increase coffee prices for consumers in the United States. Findings throughout are contextualized within Political Economy considerations. Overall, the study demonstrates how integrating regression, clustering, and simulation with economic theory exemplified through the coffee sector analysis provides a robust framework for assessing the potential systemic impacts, including consumer price effects, of strategic trade policies.

Equilibrium propagation (EP) is a compelling alternative to the backpropagation of error algorithm (BP) for computing gradients of neural networks on biological or analog neuromorphic substrates. Still, the algorithm requires weight symmetry and infinitesimal equilibrium perturbations, i.e., nudges, to estimate unbiased gradients efficiently. Both requirements are challenging to implement in physical systems. Yet, whether and how weight asymmetry affects its applicability is unknown because, in practice, it may be masked by biases introduced through the finite nudge. To address this question, we study generalized EP, which can be formulated without weight symmetry, and analytically isolate the two sources of bias. For complex-differentiable non-symmetric networks, we show that the finite nudge does not pose a problem, as exact derivatives can still be estimated via a Cauchy integral. In contrast, weight asymmetry introduces bias resulting in low task performance due to poor alignment of EP's neuronal error vectors compared to BP. To mitigate this issue, we present a new homeostatic objective that directly penalizes functional asymmetries of the Jacobian at the network's fixed point. This homeostatic objective dramatically improves the network's ability to solve complex tasks such as ImageNet 32x32. Our results lay the theoretical groundwork for studying and mitigating the adverse effects of imperfections of physical networks on learning algorithms that rely on the substrate's relaxation dynamics.

When forecasting hourly returns for 1,000 US equities, we observe an unexpected phenomenon: predictions become nearly flat and show poor stock ranking, as measured by cross-sectional correlation. We call this forecast collapse. Surprisingly, the phenomenon largely disappears when forecasting trading volume under the same setting. We investigate forecast collapse across time-series foundation models (TSFMs), twelve deep-learning forecasting models, and 97 public benchmark configurations, and find that it is closely tied to target predictability. We identify two distinct reasons behind it: low predictability limits the amplitude of calibrated point forecasts, while per-series objectives leave cross-series structure unidentified. These findings reveal a calibration-ranking tradeoff: optimizing squared error leads to flat predictions, whereas directly optimizing cross-sectional correlation improves ranking but can inflate forecast amplitude by more than an order of magnitude. To address this tradeoff, we introduce CalibRank, a simple objective that balances calibration and ranking. On Finance1K, CalibRank nearly triples cross-sectional correlation while keeping amplitude close to the target, and improves correlation on all tested models. Our results reveal a blind spot in conventional time-series evaluation: per-series metrics can hide failures in cross-series structure needed by downstream decisions.

Time series forecasting is essential in various domains. Compared to relying solely on endogenous variables (i.e., target variables), considering exogenous variables (i.e., covariates) provides additional predictive information and often leads to more accurate predictions. However, existing methods for time series forecasting with exogenous variables (TSF-X) have the following shortcomings: 1) they do not leverage future exogenous variables, 2) they fail to fully account for the correlation between endogenous and exogenous variables. In this study, to better leverage exogenous variables, especially future exogenous variables, we propose DAG, which utilizes Dual correlAtion network along both the temporal and channel dimensions for time series forecasting with exoGenous variables. Specifically, we propose two core components: the Temporal Correlation Module and the Channel Correlation Module. Both modules consist of a correlation discovery submodule and a correlation injection submodule. The former is designed to capture the correlation effects of historical exogenous variables on future exogenous variables and on historical endogenous variables, respectively. The latter injects the discovered correlation relationships into the processes of forecasting future endogenous variables based on historical endogenous variables and future exogenous variables.

Estimating causal effect using machine learning (ML) algorithms can help to relax functional form assumptions if used within appropriate frameworks. However, most of these frameworks assume settings with cross-sectional data, whereas researchers often have access to panel data, which in traditional methods helps to deal with unobserved heterogeneity between units. In this paper, we explore how we can adapt double/debiased machine learning (DML) (Chernozhukov et al., 2018) for panel data in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. This adaptation is challenging because DML's cross-fitting procedure assumes independent data and the unobserved heterogeneity is not necessarily additively separable in settings with nonlinear observed confounding. We assess the performance of several intuitively appealing estimators in a variety of simulations. While we find violations of the cross-fitting assumptions to be largely inconsequential for the accuracy of the effect estimates, many of the considered methods fail to adequately account for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. However, we find that using predictive models based on the correlated random effects approach (Mundlak, 1978) within DML leads to accurate coefficient estimates across settings, given a sample size that is large relative to the number of observed confounders. We also show that the influence of the unobserved heterogeneity on the observed confounders plays a significant role for the performance of most alternative methods.

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.

Completely randomized experiments, originally developed by Fisher and Neyman in the 1930s, are still widely used in practice, even in online experimentation. However, such designs are of limited value for answering standard questions in marketplaces, where multiple populations of agents interact strategically, leading to complex patterns of spillover effects. In this paper, we derive the finite-sample properties of tractable estimators for "Simple Multiple Randomization Designs" (SMRDs), a new class of experimental designs which account for complex spillover effects in randomized experiments. Our derivations are obtained under a natural and general form of cross-unit interference, which we call "local interference". We discuss the estimation of main effects, direct effects, and spillovers, and present associated central limit theorems.

Grid edge resources refer to distributed energy resources (DERs) located on the consumer side of the electrical grid, controlled by consumers rather than utility companies. Integrating DERs with real-time electricity pricing can better align distributed supply with system demand, improving grid efficiency and reliability. However, DER owners, known as prosumers, often lack the expertise and resources to directly participate in wholesale energy markets, limiting their ability to fully realize the economic potential of their assets. Meanwhile, as DER adoption grows, the number of prosumers participating in the energy system is expected to increase significantly, creating additional challenges in coordination and market participation. To address these challenges, we propose a mean-field game framework that enables prosumers to autonomously learn optimal decision policies based on dynamic market prices and their variable solar generation. Our framework is designed to accommodate heterogeneous agents and demonstrates the existence of a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) in a wholesale energy market with many prosumers. Additionally, we introduce an algorithm that automates prosumers' resource control, facilitating real-time decision-making for energy storage management. Numerical experiments suggest that our approach converges towards an MFE and effectively reduces peak loads and price volatility, especially during periods of external demand or supply shocks. This study highlights the potential of a fully decentralized approach to integrating DERs into wholesale markets while improving market efficiency.

We consider dense, associative neural-networks trained with no supervision and we investigate their computational capabilities analytically, via a statistical-mechanics approach, and numerically, via Monte Carlo simulations. In particular, we obtain a phase diagram summarizing their performance as a function of the control parameters such as the quality and quantity of the training dataset and the network storage, valid in the limit of large network size and structureless datasets. Moreover, we establish a bridge between macroscopic observables standardly used in statistical mechanics and loss functions typically used in the machine learning. As technical remarks, from the analytic side, we implement large deviations and stability analysis within Guerra's interpolation to tackle the not-Gaussian distributions involved in the post-synaptic potentials while, from the computational counterpart, we insert Plefka approximation in the Monte Carlo scheme, to speed up the evaluation of the synaptic tensors, overall obtaining a novel and broad approach to investigate neural networks in general.

The entropic fictitious play (EFP) is a recently proposed algorithm that minimizes the sum of a convex functional and entropy in the space of measures -- such an objective naturally arises in the optimization of a two-layer neural network in the mean-field regime. In this work, we provide a concise primal-dual analysis of EFP in the setting where the learning problem exhibits a finite-sum structure. We establish quantitative global convergence guarantees for both the continuous-time and discrete-time dynamics based on properties of a proximal Gibbs measure introduced in Nitanda et al. (2022). Furthermore, our primal-dual framework entails a memory-efficient particle-based implementation of the EFP update, and also suggests a connection to gradient boosting methods. We illustrate the efficiency of our novel implementation in experiments including neural network optimization and image synthesis.

Multi-agent systems can improve reliability, yet under a fixed inference budget they often help, saturate, or even collapse. We develop a minimal and calibratable theory that predicts these regimes from three binding constraints of modern agent stacks: finite context windows, lossy inter-agent communication, and shared failures among similar agents. Each leaf agent is summarized by a compute-performance scaling exponent β; communication is captured by a message-length fidelity curve γ(m); dependence is captured by an effective shared-error correlation ρ; and a context window W imposes hard fan-in limits that make hierarchy necessary. For binary success/failure tasks with majority aggregation, we prove a sharp phase transition for deep b-ary trees with correlated inputs and lossy communication: a single scalar α_ρ (combining γ(m), ρ, and fan-in b) determines whether weak signal is amplified to a nontrivial fixed point or washed out to chance. In the amplifying regime, we derive an organization exponent s and show that budgeted synergy, i.e., outperforming the best single agent under the same total budget, occurs exactly when s>β, yielding closed-form compute allocation rules and explicit budget thresholds. We further characterize saturation via a mixing depth and provide a conservative clipped predictor that remains accurate across growth and saturation. A continuous-performance warm-up gives closed-form risks for star, chain, and tree organizations, making correlation- and communication-induced floors explicit and exposing the core design trade-offs in a smooth setting. Finally, we validate the predicted phase boundaries in controlled synthetic simulations and show how the same mechanisms explain the dominant bottlenecks reported in recent large-scale matched-budget studies of LLM agent-system scaling.

Boltzmann generators approach the sampling problem in many-body physics by combining a normalizing flow and a statistical reweighting method to generate samples in thermodynamic equilibrium. The equilibrium distribution is usually defined by an energy function and a thermodynamic state. Here we propose temperature-steerable flows (TSF) which are able to generate a family of probability densities parametrized by a choosable temperature parameter. TSFs can be embedded in generalized ensemble sampling frameworks to sample a physical system across multiple thermodynamic states.

We revisit Tirole's classic paper "Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations" (1985, Econometrica) in the case of a dividend-paying asset. Recently, Pham and Toda (2026) constructed a counterexample to Proposition 1(c), showing that Tirole's equilibrium classification is incorrect as stated and that long-run outcomes can depend on initial capital. This paper characterizes the entire set of equilibrium initial asset prices under capital over-accumulation. Exactly one of three regimes occurs: (i) a unique bubbleless equilibrium with capital converging to zero (capital collapse), (ii) a unique asymptotically bubbly equilibrium converging to a positive steady state (bubble necessity), or (iii) a continuum of equilibria with different long-run bubble behavior (indeterminacy). We further derive a threshold for initial capital under the bubble necessity condition, establish preference-free sufficient conditions for capital collapse, and show that the continuum in the pure bubble model survives sufficiently small dividend perturbations. Closed-form examples illustrate the possible long-run outcomes.

A growing trend for value-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms is to capture more information than scalar value functions in the value network. One of the most well-known methods in this branch is distributional RL, which models return distribution instead of scalar value. In another line of work, hybrid reward architectures (HRA) in RL have studied to model source-specific value functions for each source of reward, which is also shown to be beneficial in performance. To fully inherit the benefits of distributional RL and hybrid reward architectures, we introduce Multi-Dimensional Distributional DQN (MD3QN), which extends distributional RL to model the joint return distribution from multiple reward sources. As a by-product of joint distribution modeling, MD3QN can capture not only the randomness in returns for each source of reward, but also the rich reward correlation between the randomness of different sources. We prove the convergence for the joint distributional Bellman operator and build our empirical algorithm by minimizing the Maximum Mean Discrepancy between joint return distribution and its Bellman target. In experiments, our method accurately models the joint return distribution in environments with richly correlated reward functions, and outperforms previous RL methods utilizing multi-dimensional reward functions in the control setting.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Electricity systems are key to transforming today's society into a carbon-free economy. Long-term electricity market mechanisms, including auctions, support schemes, and other policy instruments, are critical in shaping the electricity generation mix. In light of the need for more advanced tools to support policymakers and other stakeholders in designing, testing, and evaluating long-term markets, this work presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning model capable of capturing the key features of decarbonizing energy systems. Profit-maximizing generation companies make investment decisions in the wholesale electricity market, responding to system needs, competitive dynamics, and policy signals. The model employs independent proximal policy optimization, which was selected for suitability to the decentralized and competitive environment. Nevertheless, given the inherent challenges of independent learning in multi-agent settings, an extensive hyperparameter search ensures that decentralized training yields market outcomes consistent with competitive behavior. The model is applied to a stylized version of the Italian electricity system and tested under varying levels of competition, market designs, and policy scenarios. Results highlight the critical role of market design for decarbonizing the electricity sector and avoiding price volatility. The proposed framework allows assessing long-term electricity markets in which multiple policy and market mechanisms interact simultaneously, with market participants responding and adapting to decarbonization pathways.

The classical Coulomb gas model has served as one of the most versatile frameworks in statistical physics, connecting a vast range of phenomena across many different areas. Nonequilibrium generalisations of this model have so far been studied much more scarcely. With the abundance of contemporary research into active and driven systems, one would naturally expect that such generalisations of systems with long-ranged Coulomb-like interactions will form a fertile playground for interesting developments. Here, we present two examples of novel macroscopic behaviour that arise from nonequilibrium fluctuations in long-range interacting systems, namely (1) unscreened long-ranged correlations in strong electrolytes driven by an external electric field and the associated fluctuation-induced forces in the confined Casimir geometry, and (2) out-of-equilibrium critical behaviour in self-chemotactic models that incorporate the particle polarity in the chemotactic response of the cells. Both of these systems have nonlocal Coulomb-like interactions among their constituent particles, namely, the electrostatic interactions in the case of the driven electrolyte, and the chemotactic forces mediated by fast-diffusing signals in the case of self-chemotactic systems. The results presented here hint to the rich phenomenology of nonequilibrium effects that can arise from strong fluctuations in Coulomb interacting systems, and a rich variety of potential future directions, which are discussed.

We study a fully connected Hopfield-type associative memory network with online activity-dependent synaptic plasticity, where neural states and synaptic couplings coevolve during retrieval. Using the generating-functional formalism, we derive a dynamical mean-field theory (DMFT) in the large-system limit with extensively many stored random patterns, and show that the many-body dynamics reduces to an effective single-site stochastic process with colored Gaussian crosstalk noise and delayed feedback terms. Numerical solutions of the DMFT equations agree well with direct simulations. We find that moderate plasticity enlarges the basin of attraction and increases the maximum retrievable memory load by generating a positive delayed feedback that stabilizes retrieval against crosstalk noise. However, excessively strong plasticity causes the network to imprint the imperfect initial cue itself, leading to spurious attractors and degraded retrieval performance. Consequently, an optimal plasticity strength emerges from the trade-off between memory stabilization and premature cue imprinting. These results extend the DMFT description of associative memory to networks with coevolving neural and synaptic dynamics.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

We study mean field portfolio games under Epstein-Zin preferences, which naturally encompass the classical time-additive power utility as a special case. In a general non-Markovian framework, we establish a uniqueness result by proving a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and the solutions to a class of BSDEs. A key ingredient in our approach is a necessary stochastic maximum principle tailored to Epstein-Zin utility and a nonlinear transformation. In the deterministic setting, we further derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equilibrium investment and consumption policies.

Complex reinforcement learning environments frequently employ multi-task and mixed-reward formulations. In these settings, heterogeneous reward distributions and correlated reward dimensions often destabilize the construction of scalar advantages. To address these challenges, we propose Reward-Decorrelated Policy Optimization (RDPO), a reward-processing method designed to explicitly target both failure modes. RDPO first utilizes Magnitude-Aware Quantile normalization to stabilize prompt-level advantage allocation across binary, fractional, and continuous rewards. It then applies Mahalanobis whitening within each active reward subspace to mitigate correlation redundancy prior to aggregation. When applied during the post-training of LongCat-Flash, RDPO enhances instruction following, writing quality, and robustness to hard prompts while remaining broadly competitive on reasoning and coding evaluations.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

Model fairness is an essential element for Trustworthy AI. While many techniques for model fairness have been proposed, most of them assume that the training and deployment data distributions are identical, which is often not true in practice. In particular, when the bias between labels and sensitive groups changes, the fairness of the trained model is directly influenced and can worsen. We make two contributions for solving this problem. First, we analytically show that existing in-processing fair algorithms have fundamental limits in accuracy and group fairness. We introduce the notion of correlation shifts, which can explicitly capture the change of the above bias. Second, we propose a novel pre-processing step that samples the input data to reduce correlation shifts and thus enables the in-processing approaches to overcome their limitations. We formulate an optimization problem for adjusting the data ratio among labels and sensitive groups to reflect the shifted correlation. A key benefit of our approach lies in decoupling the roles of pre- and in-processing approaches: correlation adjustment via pre-processing and unfairness mitigation on the processed data via in-processing. Experiments show that our framework effectively improves existing in-processing fair algorithms w.r.t. accuracy and fairness, both on synthetic and real datasets.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

Predicting the dependencies between observations from multiple time series is critical for applications such as anomaly detection, financial risk management, causal analysis, or demand forecasting. However, the computational and numerical difficulties of estimating time-varying and high-dimensional covariance matrices often limits existing methods to handling at most a few hundred dimensions or requires making strong assumptions on the dependence between series. We propose to combine an RNN-based time series model with a Gaussian copula process output model with a low-rank covariance structure to reduce the computational complexity and handle non-Gaussian marginal distributions. This permits to drastically reduce the number of parameters and consequently allows the modeling of time-varying correlations of thousands of time series. We show on several real-world datasets that our method provides significant accuracy improvements over state-of-the-art baselines and perform an ablation study analyzing the contributions of the different components of our model.

This paper reformulates the Greenwood and Guner (2009) marriage and divorce model in continuous time using the HACT methods of Achdou et al. (2022). Replacing the AR(1) match quality process with an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process yields a tridiagonal generator, reducing the computational complexity of both the value function and stationary distribution calculations from quadratic to linear in the number of grid points. The continuous-time model closely replicates the discrete-time equilibrium across all key outcomes, including the share of married households, the marriage rate, and the divorce rate, while achieving substantial gains in computation time and memory usage.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

We consider the problem of graph matching, or learning vertex correspondence, between two correlated stochastic block models (SBMs). The graph matching problem arises in various fields, including computer vision, natural language processing and bioinformatics, and in particular, matching graphs with inherent community structure has significance related to de-anonymization of correlated social networks. Compared to the correlated Erdos-Renyi (ER) model, where various efficient algorithms have been developed, among which a few algorithms have been proven to achieve the exact matching with constant edge correlation, no low-order polynomial algorithm has been known to achieve exact matching for the correlated SBMs with constant correlation. In this work, we propose an efficient algorithm for matching graphs with community structure, based on the comparison between partition trees rooted from each vertex, by extending the idea of Mao et al. (2021) to graphs with communities. The partition tree divides the large neighborhoods of each vertex into disjoint subsets using their edge statistics to different communities. Our algorithm is the first low-order polynomial-time algorithm achieving exact matching between two correlated SBMs with high probability in dense graphs.

In liberalised railway systems, operators must set prices dynamically in an environment with partial observability, as they retain private information about their objectives and performance, where regulatory constraints prohibit communication or direct information exchange between competitors to prevent explicit collusion. Consequently, agents must learn to infer strategic interactions only from observable market data which presents a significant challenge for multi-agent reinforcement learning, where standard approaches typically treat observations as unstructured vectors, ignoring the underlying market topology that governs strategic interactions. To address this, an entity graph modelling approach is proposed, which represents the environment as a graph of operational units, rather than decision-making agents or static infrastructure, encoding competition, coordination, and connectivity relations between entities. Then, an extension of the multi-agent twin delayed deep deterministic policy gradient algorithm with graph-based representation learning processes the features of the entities through a multi-layer relational graph convolutional network and aggregates them via a learnt attention mechanism. Experimental results in a rail pricing reinforcement learning environment show that this novel framework achieves higher revenue and stability in two different settings of increasing market complexity compared to a representative selection of relational and non-relational baselines. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Kinrre/RelationalRailPricing-RL

Many examples of cooperation exist in biology. In chemical systems however, which can sometimes be quite complex, we do not appear to observe intricate cooperative interactions. A key question for the origin of life, is then how can molecular cooperation first arise in an abiotic system prior to the emergence of biological replication. We postulate that selection at the molecular level is a driving force behind the complexification of chemical systems, particularly during the origins of life. In the theory of multilevel selection the two selective forces are: within-group and between-group, where the former tends to favor "selfish" replication of individuals and the latter favor cooperation between individuals enhancing the replication of the group as a whole. These forces can be quantified using the Price equation, which is a standard tool used in evolutionary biology to quantify evolutionary change. Our central claim is that replication and heredity in chemical systems are subject to selection, and quantifiable using the multilevel Price equation. We demonstrate this using the Graded Autocatalysis Replication Domain computer model, describing simple protocell composed out of molecules and its replication, which respectively analogue to the group and the individuals. In contrast to previous treatments of this model, we treat the lipid molecules themselves as replicating individuals and the protocells they form as groups of individuals. Our goal is to demonstrate how evolutionary biology tools and concepts can be applied in chemistry and we suggest that molecular cooperation may arise as a result of group selection. Further, the biological relation of parent-progeny is proposed to be analogue to the reactant-product relation in chemistry, thus allowing for tools from evolutionary biology to be applied to chemistry and would deepen the connection between chemistry and biology.

Several studies have compared the in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) performance of models in computer vision and NLP. They report a frequent positive correlation and some surprisingly never even observe an inverse correlation indicative of a necessary trade-off. The possibility of inverse patterns is important to determine whether ID performance can serve as a proxy for OOD generalization capabilities. This paper shows with multiple datasets that inverse correlations between ID and OOD performance do happen in real-world data - not only in theoretical worst-case settings. We also explain theoretically how these cases can arise even in a minimal linear setting, and why past studies could miss such cases due to a biased selection of models. Our observations lead to recommendations that contradict those found in much of the current literature. - High OOD performance sometimes requires trading off ID performance. - Focusing on ID performance alone may not lead to optimal OOD performance. It may produce diminishing (eventually negative) returns in OOD performance. - In these cases, studies on OOD generalization that use ID performance for model selection (a common recommended practice) will necessarily miss the best-performing models, making these studies blind to a whole range of phenomena.

We introduce the Consensus-Bottleneck Asset Pricing Model (CB-APM), a framework that reconciles the predictive power of deep learning with the structural transparency of traditional finance. By embedding aggregate analyst consensus as a structural "bottleneck", the model treats professional beliefs as a sufficient statistic for the market's high-dimensional information set. We document a striking "interpretability-accuracy amplification effect" for annual horizons, the structural constraint acts as an endogenous regularizer that significantly improves out-of-sample R2 over unconstrained benchmarks. Portfolios sorted on CB-APM forecasts exhibit a strong monotonic return gradient, delivering an annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.44 and robust performance across macroeconomic regimes. Furthermore, pricing diagnostics reveal that the learned consensus captures priced variation only partially spanned by canonical factor models, identifying structured risk heterogeneity that standard linear models systematically miss. Our results suggest that anchoring machine intelligence to human-expert belief formation is not merely a tool for transparency, but a catalyst for uncovering new dimensions of belief-driven risk premiums.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

Energy markets exhibit complex causal relationships between weather patterns, generation technologies, and price formation, with regime changes occurring continuously rather than at discrete break points. Current approaches model electricity prices without explicit causal interpretation or counterfactual reasoning capabilities. We introduce Augmented Time Series Causal Models (ATSCM) for energy markets, extending counterfactual reasoning frameworks to multivariate temporal data with learned causal structure. Our approach models energy systems through interpretable factors (weather, generation mix, demand patterns), rich grid dynamics, and observable market variables. We integrate neural causal discovery to learn time-varying causal graphs without requiring ground truth DAGs. Applied to real-world electricity price data, ATSCM enables novel counterfactual queries such as "What would prices be under different renewable generation scenarios?".

In this paper we develop a model of an order-driven market where traders set bids and asks and post market or limit orders according to exogenously fixed rules. Agents are assumed to have three components to the expectation of future asset returns, namely-fundamentalist, chartist and noise trader. Furthermore agents differ in the characteristics describing these components, such as time horizon, risk aversion and the weights given to the various components. The model developed here extends a great deal of earlier literature in that the order submissions of agents are determined by utility maximisation, rather than the mechanical unit order size that is commonly assumed. In this way the order flow is better related to the ongoing evolution of the market. For the given market structure we analyze the impact of the three components of the trading strategies on the statistical properties of prices and order flows and observe that it is the chartist strategy that is mainly responsible of the fat tails and clustering in the artificial price data generated by the model. The paper provides further evidence that large price changes are likely to be generated by the presence of large gaps in the book.

Spurious correlations allow flexible models to predict well during training but poorly on related test distributions. Recent work has shown that models that satisfy particular independencies involving correlation-inducing nuisance variables have guarantees on their test performance. Enforcing such independencies requires nuisances to be observed during training. However, nuisances, such as demographics or image background labels, are often missing. Enforcing independence on just the observed data does not imply independence on the entire population. Here we derive mmd estimators used for invariance objectives under missing nuisances. On simulations and clinical data, optimizing through these estimates achieves test performance similar to using estimators that make use of the full data.

The Gauge-Including Projector Augmented Wave (GIPAW) method, within the Density Functional Theory (DFT) Generalized Gradient Approximation (GGA) framework, is applied to compute solid state NMR parameters for ^{27}Al in the α, θ, and κ aluminium oxide phases and their gibbsite and boehmite precursors. The results for well-established crystalline phases compare very well with available experimental data and provide confidence in the accuracy of the method. For γ-alumina, four structural models proposed in the literature are discussed in terms of their ability to reproduce the experimental spectra also reported in the literature. Among the considered models, the Fd3m structure proposed by Paglia {\it et al.} [Phys. Rev. B {\bf 71}, 224115 (2005)] shows the best agreement. We attempt to link the theoretical NMR parameters to the local geometry. Chemical shifts depend on coordination number but no further correlation is found with geometrical parameters. Instead our calculations reveal that, within a given coordination number, a linear correlation exists between chemical shifts and Born effective charges.

From a viewpoint of stochastic thermodynamics, we derive equations that describe the collective dynamics near the order-disorder transition in the globally coupled XY model and near the synchronization-desynchronization transition in the Kuramoto model. A new way of thinking is to interpret the deterministic time evolution of a macroscopic variable as an external operation to a thermodynamic system. We then find that the irreversible work determines the equation for the collective dynamics. When analyzing the Kuramoto model, we employ a generalized concept of irreversible work which originates from a non-equilibrium identity associated with steady state thermodynamics.

In this paper, we study the Hard Core (HC) model with a countable set mathbb Z of spin values on a Cayley tree of order k=2. This model is defined by a countable set of parameters (that is, the activity function λ_i>0, iin mathbb Z). A functional equation is obtained that provides the consistency condition for finite-dimensional Gibbs distributions. Analyzing this equation, the following results are obtained: Let kgeq 2 and Λ=sum_iλ_i. For Λ=+infty there is no translation-invariant Gibbs measure (TIGM); Let k=2 and Λ<+infty. For the model under constraint such that at G-admissible graph the loops are imposed at two vertices of the graph, the uniqueness of TIGM is proved; Let k=2 and Λ<+infty. For the model under constraint such that at G-admissible graph the loops are imposed at three vertices of the graph, the uniqueness and non-uniqueness conditions of TIGMs are found.

Price responsiveness is a major feature of end use customers (EUCs) that participate in demand response (DR) programs, and has been conventionally modeled with static demand functions, which take the electricity price as the input and the aggregate energy consumption as the output. This, however, neglects the inherent temporal correlation of the EUC behaviors, and may result in large errors when predicting the actual responses of EUCs in real-time pricing (RTP) programs. In this paper, we propose a dynamical DR model so as to capture the temporal behavior of the EUCs. The states in the proposed dynamical DR model can be explicitly chosen, in which case the model can be represented by a linear function or a multi-layer feedforward neural network, or implicitly chosen, in which case the model can be represented by a recurrent neural network or a long short-term memory unit network. In both cases, the dynamical DR model can be learned from historical price and energy consumption data. Numerical simulation illustrated how the states are chosen and also showed the proposed dynamical DR model significantly outperforms the static ones.